ANIMAL PAIN AND THE COMMUNITY OF ALL CREATURES: VARIATIONS ON A THEME IN C.S. LEWIS[1]

BY JOHN MCATEER

filmphilosopher@gmail.com

The Problem of Pain is C.S. Lewis's first work of theological nonfiction and remains one of his most beloved books -- except, that is, for its somewhat embarrassing chapter on "animal pain" in which Lewis infamously argues for the possibility that pets will be in heaven with their owners. Most discussions of Lewis's theodicy don't even mention his theology of animals. And Lewis himself is careful at several points to remind us that his suggestions about the solution to animal pain are only "speculative" (p. xii, cf. p. 108, 133[2]) and that he is ready to be "set right by real theologians" (p. 143). I think he sells himself short. The very fact that a medieval literature professor is willing to wrestle, even speculatively, with this difficult topic sets him ahead of most professional theologians who, in Lewis's words, "do not seem to see that there is a real problem, who are content to say that animals are, after all, only animals".[3] Lewis rightly sees that "pain without guilt or moral fruit, however low and contemptible the sufferer may be, is a very serious matter".[4] Lewis is to be commended for giving this serious matter the consideration it deserves. Furthermore my analysis here will show that Lewis's solution to the problem of animal pain, including his often-ridiculed hypothesis of animal resurrection, is actually integral to his overall solution to the problem of evil – a theodicy which rests on a vision of the Christian narrative of Creation, Fall and Redemption. Hence the chapter on animals will turn out not to be an appendix of mere speculation separable from the rest of *The Problem of Pain*.

Far from being a tacked-on ending, Lewis actually *begins* his book with the problem of animal pain. Chapter 1 opens with the discussion of Lewis's youthful atheism: "Not many years ago when I was an atheist, if anyone had asked me, 'Why do you not believe in God?' my reply would have run something like this: 'Look at the universe we live in. …" (p. 1). In our post-Dawinian understanding, the universe, as Tennyson said, is "red in tooth and claw". Life is short, and even while it lasts it is, as Lewis points out, "so arranged that all the forms of it can live only by preying upon one another" (p. 2). The young Lewis could not imagine this violent world to be the work of an infinitely good and loving Creator: "If you ask me to believe that this is the work of a benevolent and omnipotent spirit, I reply that all the evidence points in the opposite direction. Either there is no spirit behind the universe, or else a spirit indifferent to good and evil, or else an evil spirit" (p. 3). The problem of animal pain, then, was at the center of Lewis's own difficulty with accepting Christianity.

Lewis goes on for the rest of Chapter 1 – indeed for the next seven chapters – to focus entirely on the problem of human pain. He gives a rather traditional "free will defense" in which God's goodness demands granting humans freedom of will. Lewis argues that free will entails the fixity of natural laws in the context of which humans can act despite the fact that humans can abuse these laws to their own and others' detriment (p. 19-25). The problem with this sort of free will defense is that it does not cover what philosophers call "natural evil", things like earthquakes, floods, diseases, etc. Lewis himself notes that "It is men, not God, who have produced the racks, whips, prisons, slavery, guns, bayonets, and bombs; it is by human avarice or human stupidity, not by the

churlishness of nature, that we have poverty and overwork. But there remains, none the less, much suffering which cannot thus be traced to ourselves" (p. 86).

Therefore Lewis is led to suggest a "vale of soul-making"[5] amendment to the free will defense. According to the soul-making theodicy, human pain and suffering is meant to rehabilitate our rebellious souls, restoring them to their proper relationship to God and God's creation – and to be the infernal consequence for those who eternally remain in rebellion against God. Thus Lewis memorably writes that "God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pain: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf world. A bad man, happy, is a man without the least inkling that his actions do not 'answer', that they are not in accord with the laws of the universe" (p. 91). In other words, without the possibility of suffering, we could never learn to be virtuous.

But Lewis is still not, as we should not expect him to be given his starting point in the vision of predatory nature, ultimately satisfied with this soul-making theodicy. The problem is, of course, that "the Christian explanation of human pain cannot be extended to animal pain. So far as we know beasts are incapable either of sin or virtue: therefore they can neither deserve nor be improved by it" (p. 132). For Lewis, "The intrinsic evil of the animal world lies in the fact that animals, or some animals, live by destroying each other" (p. 138). But how can we imagine a good God to have created a world in which innocent creatures are forced to hunt and kill one another in gruesome ways just to survive? Lacking an explanation of animal predation, we have not yet overcome the original problem of pain: "Either there is no spirit behind the universe, or else a spirit indifferent to good and evil, or else an evil spirit" (p. 3). The most common philosophical answer to this problem in Lewis's day was that animals do not in fact suffer

pain, and so there is no problem. Lewis finds this easy solution not only unacceptable but even dangerous. Quoting G.K. Chesteron, Lewis once described this sort of argument as one of "the easy speeches that comfort cruel men".[6] Lewis, then, must begin his chapter on animal pain by motivating the "cruel men" to take this problem seriously. He must establish the *fact* of animal suffering.

In his earlier discussion of human pain, Lewis had distinguished the *physical sensation* of pain (which he nicely notes is not always disagreeable and can sometimes be enjoyed) from *suffering*, properly so-called. He defines the latter as "any experience, whether physical or mental, which the patient dislikes" (p. 87). Turning now to animal pain, Lewis further distinguishes mere sentience from the full-blooded self-conscious experience of pain. This latter distinction rests on a two-fold distinction first between animal life and sentient life (a sub-set of animals which includes humans), and second between sentient life and conscious life (p. 134). So we have three levels of animal life: (1) mere *animal* life, (2) *sentient* life, and (3) *conscious* life. And we have three corresponding levels of pain: (1) instinctive *behavioral* avoidance of certain stimuli, which Lewis declines to think of as "pain" properly so-called, (2) the actual *sensation* of pain, and (3) the psychological *suffering* of a self-conscious being. The move from (1) to (2) involves the development of a complex nervous system, and the move from (2) to (3) involves the development of self-consciousness.

While he admits that it is likely that "the life of a newt is merely a succession of sensation" and that, as such, it lacks the self-consciousness to "recognize itself as the same newt" from moment to moment (p. 141), Lewis nevertheless insists that it "is certainly difficult to suppose that the apes, the elephant, and the higher domestic animals,

have not, in some degree, a self or soul which connects experiences and gives rise to rudimentary individuality" (p. 136). Hence, on Lewis's view, an insect would exist at level (1) mere animality,[7] a newt at level (2) sentience, and an ape at level (3) consciousness. In other words, Lewis insists that, while he must admit that "a great deal of what appears to be animal suffering need not be suffering in any real sense" (p. 137), nevertheless there is at least *some* genuine animal suffering and hence there is a real problem of animal pain which theologians must take seriously.

In elaborating what exactly is involved in the distinction between sentience and consciousness – i.e., between levels (2) and (3) – Lewis asks us to "Suppose that three sensations follow one another – first A, then B, then C. When this happens to you, you have the experience of passing through the process ABC" (p. 135). He goes on to argue that this experience

> implies that there is something in you which stands sufficiently outside A to notice A passing away, and sufficiently outside B to notice B now beginning and coming to fill the place which A has vacated; and something which recognizes itself as the same through the transition from A to B and B to C, so it can say 'I have had the experience ABC'. Now this something is what I call Consciousness or Soul. (p. 135)

Lewis takes this to be a refutation of David Hume's theory of the soul as a mere bundle of sensations: "The simplest experience of ABC as a succession demands a soul which is not itself a mere succession of states, but rather a permanent bed along which these different portions of the stream of sensation roll, and which recognizes itself as the same beneath them all" (p. 135).[8] Hence without self-consciousness, an animal could feel the sensation of pain but would not "know" that it had felt pain.[9] Its pain would therefore be "unconscious" and its reactions to pain would be like human reactions "under chloroform" or while asleep:

> This would mean that if you give such a creature two blows with a whip, there are, indeed, two pains: but there is no-coordinating self which can recognize that 'I have had two pains.' Even in the single pain, there is no self to say 'I am in pain' – for if it could distinguish itself from the sensation – the bed from the stream – sufficiently to say 'I am in pain', it would also be able to connect the two sensations as *its* experience. The correct description would be 'Pain is taking place in this animal'; not, as we commonly say, 'This animal feels pain'… (p. 136)

So some level of conscious self-identity is necessary to transform mere sensation of pain into genuine suffering, but Lewis has no doubt that higher mammals have enough of a "self" to be able to experience conscious suffering.

So far, so good. But, having established the *fact* of animal suffering, Lewis now turns to the *origin* of animal suffering. And it is at this point that Lewis's theodicy gets both more interesting and more controversial. If God's original creation was "very good" (Genesis 1:31), then how did the evil of animal suffering enter into the world in the first place? Lewis rejects the appeal of "earlier generations" to the Fall of Adam in which "the whole world was infected by the uncreating rebellion of Adam" because, given modern evolutionary biology, "we have good reason to believe that animals existed long before men. Carnivorousness, with all that it entails, is older than humanity" (p. 137).[10] For Lewis, God's Creation itself should be seen as an evolutionary process of higher life emerging from lower: "in the story of creation, God had raised vegetable life to become the vehicle of animality, and chemical processes to be the vehicle of vegetation, and physical processes to be the vehicle of chemical" (p. 78). Thus, through the mechanism of evolution, God produced the natural species *homo sapiens*, but at some point the supernatural *imago dei* must have "descended" on one of them and made it truly human. Before that, the first human being

> was only an animal because all its physical and psychical processes were directed to purely material and natural ends. Then, in the fullness of time, God caused to descend upon this organism, both on its psychology and physiology, a new kind of consciousness which could say 'I' and 'me', which could look upon itself as an object, which knew God, which could make judgments of truth, beauty, and goodness, and which was so far above time that it could perceive time flowing past. (p. 72)

Note that here Lewis *appears* to be saying that *only* humans have self-consciousness. He suggests that what separates humans from apes is consciousness of oneself as self. This is a misstatement on his part. We have already seen that he in fact believes that apes and other higher mammals can have "a rudimentary" self-consciousness, too. In fact, what Lewis actually thinks distinguishes mere *homo sapiens* from Man is that only the latter is a *spiritual* creature, made in the image of God, "aware of God as God", and hence given the "terrible alternative of choosing God or self for the centre" (p. 70) – what Lewis here calls the ability to "make judgments of truth, beauty, and goodness". This reading is confirmed when Lewis subsequently says that in the Fall of Man "the total organism which had been taken up into his spiritual life [i.e, both the psychology and physiology] was allowed to fall back into the merely natural condition from which, at his making, it had been raised" (p. 78). Lewis clearly does not think that we lost our self-consciousness in the Fall, so if we have returned to our condition as mere animals, then what we have lost is simply our spiritual connection to God.

On Lewis's view we were once, quite literally, "a little lower than the angels" (Psalm 8:5 KJV). In our unfallen state, "the human spirit had been in full control of the human organism" (p. 77). Lewis suggests that this might have looked like a "modern Yogi" who can "control those functions which to us are almost part of the external world, such as digestion and circulation" (p. 72). But ultimately Lewis thinks that it was God

who controlled the body "through" the human spirit, so when the human spirit rejected God "it had cut itself off from the source of power" and hence the organism "fell under the control of ordinary biochemical laws" (p. 77), and, as such, fallen man is "a creature ill-adapted to the universe" (p. 63). Lewis goes as far as to call this fallen condition a new *species* (p. 78-9). We have now become little more than "trousered apes"[11] with our selves as the center of our existence – but, like apes of the untrousered variety, we still *have selves*.

So, because he believes human beings evolved from lower animals before being themselves raised to their destined spiritual state, Lewis can't appeal to the Fall of humanity to explain the suffering of the animal world. Animals had lived and died and hunted and killed each other for millions of years before *homo sapiens* were even raised to the level of Man, much less before Adam fell. Hence Lewis feels we are forced to appeal to the Devil: "man was not the first creature to rebel against the Creator, but that some older and mightier being long since became apostate and is now the emperor of darkness and (significantly) the Lord of this world" (p. 137). Satan "corrupted" the world and introduced carnivorousness into animal life long before humanity existed. This move enables Lewis to read the command to have dominion over the earth as a mandate to help bring order back into this corrupted chaos:

> If this hypothesis [i.e., that carnivorousness is due to Satan] is worth considering, it is also worth considering whether man, at his first coming into the world, had not already a redemptive function to perform. Man, even now, can do wonders to animals: my cat and dog live together in my house and seem to like it. It may have been one of man's functions to restore peace to the animal world, and if he had not joined the enemy he might have succeeded in doing so to an extent now hardly imaginable. (p. 140)

In other words, before the Fall man was charged with mediating God to the lower animals.

Lewis's Satan Hypothesis faces a serious objection: God says creation is "very good" before the fall of man, but Lewis's theodicy has it that the world was already corrupted at that point in the narrative. Here is where we need to offer a kind of "friendly amendment" on behalf of Lewis. He has, indeed, made a mistake, but it need not be fatal to his overall picture. His mistake is holding to what theologian Colin Gunton calls a theory of "redemption as restoration". Defenders of the restoration theory such as Origen and Augustine "see the creation as so completely finished and perfect in the beginning that a fall can only be away from that perfection, and redemption can only mean a return to the condition of perfection".[12] While this is probably the mainstream view in Western Christianity, it is not the view of Eastern Orthodoxy. Gunton calls the alternative view, which he traces back to Ireneaus, the "eschatological" view of redemption. On this view,

> creation is a project – that is to say, it is made to go somewhere – but by virtue of the fall can reach that end only by a redemption which involves a radical redirection from the movement it takes backwards whenever sin and evil shape its direction. Creation is that which God enables to exist in time, and is in and through time to bring to its completion, rather like an artist completing a work of art. … I shall call the eschatology consequent upon this view one of completion, because it suggests that the end of redemption is not simply a return to a primal perfection, but a movement towards an end that is greater than the beginning. On such an account, redemption involves not only the defeat of evil, but its removal in such a way that the original direction or directedness of the created order is restored.[13]

In other words, even before the Fall, creation was not in its intended final state of perfection. When God rested on the seventh day, God left the creation intentionally incomplete and unfinished. This view initially rubs Western Christians the wrong way. In arguing that the creation is incomplete, isn't Gunton really arguing that the creation

wasn't perfect? How could God create something less than perfect? And doesn't Genesis 2:1 say creation was "finished" on the sixth day? In reply Gunton argues that if the creation was not in some sense imperfect (incomplete), then the fall would not have been possible. He goes on to elaborate that

> the doctrine of creation out of nothing does imply that creation is in one sense indeed complete. But it does not follow that it is perfect in the sense that it does not have to be perfected. The creation is, we might way, perfect in that it is destined for perfection. That is, it is relatively perfect: created for an eschatological perfecting. It is the eschatological destiny of the finite creation that makes a fall possible; in that sense, the creation is imperfect.[14]

Moreover, we should note that while Scripture does say the creation was "finished" (Genesis 2:1) but this comes *after* the command to subdue the earth (Genesis 1:28). Creation is finished only in the sense that God has delegated the rest of the work to us.

Sometimes the point about the mandate on humans to be God's co-creators (or, as Lewis would have it, the mandate to be God's co-redeemers) is put in terms of humanity being the *priests* of the world, the spiritual representatives of the nonhuman creation.[15] Here is how Lewis puts it:

> Wholly commanding himself, he [the first man] commanded all lower lives with which he came into contact. Even now we meet rare individuals who have a mysterious power of taming beasts. This power the Paradisal man enjoyed in eminence. The old picture of brutes sporting before Adam and fawning upon him may not be wholly symbolical. Even now more animals than you might expect are ready to adore man if they are given a reasonable opportunity: for man was made to be the priest and even, in one sense, the Christ, of the animals – the mediator through whom they apprehend so much of the Divine splendour as their irrational nature allows. (p. 73)

But without the mediation of God, humanity became more like a mere animal – and without the mediation of humanity, animals became more like plants (p. 139).

This vision of the human vocation helps explain why, in contrast to what he calls "atheistical thought" which sees wild animals as natural and domestication as artificial,

Lewis argues that the *tame* animal is "in the deepest sense, the only 'natural' animal – the only one we see occupying the place it was made to occupy, and it is on the tame animal that we must base all our doctrine of beasts" (p. 143). He goes on to suggest that as "man is *in* Christ and Christ *in* God and the Holy Spirit *in* the Church and also *in* the individual believer" so domesticated animals are "*in* their masters" (p. 143), a relation which confers a kind of selfhood on the animals. Lewis says "it will be seen that, in so far as the tame animal has a real self or personality, it owes this almost entirely to its master" (p. 143). Hence Lewis argues that it makes sense to think that animals have enough personal identity to make the hypothesis of their resurrection meaningful.

> That is to say, you must not think of a beast by itself, and call that a personality and then inquire whether God will raise and bless *that*. You must take the whole context *in* which the beast acquires its selfhood – namely 'The-goodman-and-the-goodwife-ruling-their-children-and-their-beasts-in-the-good-homestead'. The whole context may be regarded as a 'body' in the Pauline (or a closely sub-Pauline) sense; and how much of that 'body' may be raised along with the goodman and goodwife, who can predict? … If you ask, concerning an animal thus raised as a member of the whole Body of the homestead, where its personal identity resides, I answer 'Where its identity always did reside even in the earthly life – in its relation to the Body and, specially, to the master who *is* the head of that Body.' In other words, the man will know his dog: the dog will know its master, and, in knowing him, will *be* itself" (p. 143, 144).[16]

Lewis admits that this "picture" of animal resurrection does not cover wild animals, but he gives no hint as to how it could be extended to these cases (p. 144).[17] Perhaps a clue to what he is thinking is found in the novel *That Hideous Strength* where Mr. Bultitude, a tame bear, is said to have enough short term memory to generate coherent experiences but no long term memory and no general concepts, including no concept of self apart from his human master.[18]

It may be objected here that domestication is a distortion of nature and hence cannot form the basis of our theology of animals. In other words, *any lion that could*

comfortably lay down with a lamb would not really be a lion at all. In reply to this sort of thought, Lewis says

> if there is nothing in the lion but carnivorous sentience, then he is unconscious and his 'survival' would have no meaning. But if there is a rudimentary Leonine self, to that also God can give a 'body' as it pleases Him – a body no longer living by the destruction of the lamb, yet richly Leonine in the sense that it also expresses whatever energy and splendor and exulting power dwelled within the visible lion on this earth. … I think the lion, when he has ceased to be dangerous, will still be awful" (p. 147).

Along these same lines philosopher Stephen Webb: "Arguably, animal nature is in bondage to violence just as human nature is, so animals too need liberation, and such liberation will not destroy violent animals any more than it will destroy us".[19] In other words, to think that an animal must be violent to be its "true self" is to accept that violence is innate in the universe. But if we believe that the true nature of a creature is reflected by the nature of its creator, and if we believe that the true nature of God is found in Christ's nonviolent kingdom, then it at least makes sense to suppose that all violence is a result of the Fall. On this view, it is the Church's job to domesticate (or "subdue") the wild animals and teach them how to live in peace with one another just as Christ domesticates us and teaches us how to live in community. It is important to see here that when Lewis argues for the priority of domestic over wild animals, he does *not* have in mind modern factory farm techniques in which animals are treated as slaves for the benefit of humans. Remember that having "dominion" over the earth does not mean "dominating" it. In Christ's kingdom we rule by serving. Hence Evelyn Underhill is off track when she complains in a letter written to Lewis:

> Is the cow which we have turned into a milk machine or the hen we have turned into an egg machine really nearer the mind of God than its wild ancestor? This seems like saying that the black slave is the only natural negro. You surely can't

> mean that, or think that the robin redbreast in a cage doesn't put heaven in a rage.[20]

Underhill is right: Lewis *doesn't* mean that. Lewis's essay against "vivisection" clearly shows that he opposes the modern tendency to keep domestic animals in cages and treat them like slaves.[21]

So animals get a kind of selfhood insofar as they are related to human beings. But how exactly is this supposed to work? Lewis's account of the mechanism by which personal identity gets transferred from human to animal is sketchy at best. It seems to have something to do with *community*: the "goodman" rules over a "homestead", and the whole homestead is resurrected, including the animals. The key to this suggestion is Lewis's hint at the Pauline language of "the body." Paul says "For as in one body we have many members, and not all the members have the same function, so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually we are members one of another" (Romans 12:4-5; cf. 1 Cor. 12). Lewis's suggestion is that the various "functions" which members of the Church body have might be more diverse than we have hitherto imagined: *the Church might include animals*. If a farmer might be raised in Christ as a member of the Church Body, why not think the farmer's animals might be raised in the farmer as members of the farmer's domestic body? This is not as crazy as it initially sounds. Paul does say that the "whole creation" will be redeemed in the same way that "our bodies" will be redeemed (Romans 8:19-23). Likewise the Prophet Joel says that the animals "groan" (Joel 1:18) but tells them not to fear (2:22) just before his famous lines about God pouring out his Spirit on "all flesh" (2:28). Is it too much of a stretch to include animals in the flesh upon which God's redeeming Spirit will be poured? Perhaps it will seem less of a stretch if we recall that God made a "covenant" after the Flood with "all

flesh" and explicitly includes animals in that category (Genesis 9:15-16, cf. 9-10). And it cannot be denied that God gave the prophet Isaiah a vision of the Messianic community in which humans and animals live peaceably with one another (Isaiah 11). Whether Lewis's suggestion about animal resurrection is entirely plausible, it is certainly consistent with one reading of the overall Biblical narrative.

The claim that animals can be members of the community of God faces several objections, but C.S. Lewis's framework can help us see how to answer these objections. Thomas Aquinas argues that humans and animals can only be in community *metaphorically*.[22] Aquinas gives three reasons. First, literal community (or "friendship" as Aquinas calls it) requires us to wish good things for our friends. But a creature cannot "possess" good things unless it has free will with which to enjoy those goods. Second, literal friendship rests on the possibility of continuing to enjoy one another in heaven. But animals cannot have eternal life. Our discussion of Lewis, however, helps us overcome both of these objections. Lewis shows us how to think of animals can enjoying goodness in their own way and can even have an eternal life of sorts. But Lewis doesn't address the third objection. Aquinas claims that, for a human being, literal community is "regulated by reason" and hence not open to "irrational creatures". I don't know whether Aquinas would define rationality this way, but many philosophers in the wake of Wittgenstein have thought of this problem in terms of language: we can only have community with those who share our language, and we can only share language with those of a similar "form of life". In response to this sort of worry, Stephen Webb argues that domestic animals actually *do* share a form of life with their human companions. Domestic animals can communicate with humans in some ways and hence can be

considered part of a language game with us. In this way, domestication is the bringing of animals into our *community*. And if language is ontological – if it makes us the selves we are, existentially – then domestication does make animals into at least the kind of quasi-persons that Lewis suggests:

> Is there a language we share with animals, especially domesticated animals, that enables us to hear what they have to say, even though they are speechless? We are commonly tempted to think that animals have inner processes that are obscured only by their inability to speak, and thus we pretend that they could talk, if only they were physically able. Wittgenstein, however, taught that there are no private languages, and that thinking or reasoning always takes place in the public medium of language, so that if animals cannot talk, then it is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether or not they think. … But Wittgenstein also alerts us to the various kinds of language games that occur in diverse situations, and surely among these games are certain modes of communication that humans and some nonhuman animals share. Animals, after all, show us what they cannot say.[23]

In this way, perhaps we can imagine animals and humans as part of a single community. This move is almost anticipated by Lewis, because for Lewis (as for many philosophers influenced by Hegel's master-slave dialectic) being a "self" involves being part of a community: "There is no reason to suppose that self-consciousness, the recognition of a creation by itself as a 'self', can exist except in contrast with an 'other', a something which is not the self. It is against an environment and preferably a social environment, an environment of other selves, that the awareness of Myself stands out" (p. 19).[24] Hence if animals acquire self-hood from their masters, it is because these animals have entered into community with their masters.

In this way it turns out that Lewis's often too easily dismissed vision of animal resurrection is actually integral to his understanding of creation and human vocation. *To summarize*: Lewis believes God's original plan for creation had already been corrupted by the Fall of Satan before the evolution of human beings and that our original role as

bearers of God's image was to care for the earth, bringing it back into line with God's righteous plan. This element of his theodicy is motivated not by his theory of animals but by his acceptance of evolution. And yet this view of the human vocation does have implications for our relationship to animals. We were meant to live in community with animals and to lead them into community with one another. But we followed Satan instead of God, and the world got worse instead of better. In gracious response to our failure, God sent Jesus to redeem fallen humanity. The primary medium of this redemption is the Church, the Spirit-filled Body of Christ on earth. Our life in the community of the Spirit allows us to fulfill our original vocation in a limited way until, at Christ's Second Coming, we are resurrected to a new creation in which we will be fully restored to Paradise. And, since our original vocation involved living in community with animals, so, too, will our eternal life. Heaven will be a community of all creatures.

Notes

[1] The first draft of this paper was written for an interdisciplinary conference on "C.S. Lewis, The Inklings, and the Call to Christian Community" at Azusa Pacific University on Feb 7-9, 2008. Whatever good has come of my project I owe to Lewis scholar Diana Glyer who originally suggested the topic of animal pain to me and encouraged me to write a paper for the conference. Thanks are due also to Laura Ralph who presented similar work at the conference and had many helpful comments on my paper.

[2] All parenthetical page numbers are to C.S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* (HarperColins, 2001).

[3] Lewis, C.S. "The Pains of Animals" from *The Month* 3:2 (Feb 1950) reprinted in *Animals and Christianity*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Tom Regan (Crossroad, 1988), p. 60

[4] Ibid.

[5] Lewis uses this terminology on p. 109.

[6] In Linzey and Regan, p. 60.

[7] See Linzey and Regan, p. 61-2.

[8] Compare this discussion to what he says in a later essay about animal pain. Lewis likens his view of pain in sentient but non-conscious animals to "shooting pains in our own experience on those occasions when they are unaccompanied by fear. They may be intense: but they are gone as we recognize their intensity. In my own case I do not find anything in them which demands pity; they are, rather, comical. One tends to laugh. A series of such pains is, no doubt, terrible; but then the contention is that the series could not exist for sentience without consciousness" (see Linzey and Regan, p. 61).

[9] Cf. p. 142: "such creatures have no painful experience. Their nervous systems delivers the *letters* A, P, N, I, but since they cannot read they never build it up into the word PAIN."

[10] Lewis thinks the Biblical creation story featuring Adam and Eve is a "story (full of the deepest suggestion) about a magic apple of knowledge" (p. 66). It is a "myth" for which Lewis has "the deepest respect" and believes to contain a deep and subtle "truth" (ibid.) – a truth which he does not think has been falsified by the scientific discovery "that man is physically descended from animals" (p. 67). In other words, Lewis believes in evolution and thinks the story of Adam and Eve is a "fairy tale" (as I believe he calls it somewhere), though he still thinks that the story of the creation and fall are spiritually true. Indeed, he thinks that the Biblical narrative is more than merely "a symbolical representation of non-historical truth" (p. 71n3) but that we can't know exactly what happened historically speaking: "We do not know how many of these creatures [i.e., the original human beings] God made, nor how long they continued in the Paradisal state. … We have no idea in what particular act, or series of acts, the self-contradictory, impossible wish [i.e., the original sin of desiring to be one's own god] found expression." (p. 75) In short, evolutionary biology "has nothing to say for or against the doctrine of the Fall" (p. 69) or the doctrine of Creation.

[11] This term is from Lewis's *The Abolition of Man* (HarperCollins, 2001), p. 9.

[12] Gunton, Colin. *The Triune Creator* (Eerdmans, 1998), p. 11

[13] Gunton, p. 12.

[14] Gunton, p. 55.

[15] Consider, for example, what Eastern Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann writes: "The significant fact about the life in the Garden is that man is to *name* things. … [The act of naming] reveals the very essence of a thing, or rather its essence as God's gift. To name a thing is to manifest the meaning and value God gave to it, to know it as coming from God and to know its place and function within the cosmos created by God. To name a thing, in other words, is to bless God for it and in it. … The first, the basic definition of man is that he is *the priest*. He stands in the center of the world and unifies it in his act of blessing God, of both receiving the world from God and offering it to God" in *For the Life of the World* (St. Vladimir's, 1988), p. 15

[16] In *The Great Divorce,* Lewis portrays a woman who has brought her animals with her into heaven: "Every beast and bird that came near to her had its place in her love. In her they became themselves. And now the abundance of life she has in Christ from the Father flows over into them. … Redeemed humanity is still young, it has hardly come to its full strength. But already there is joy enough in the little finger of a great saint such as yonder lady to waken all the dead things of the universe into life" (p. 99).

[17] He does say that "If Christian cosmology is in *any* sense (I do not say, in a literal sense) true, then all that exists on our planet is related to man, and even the creatures that were extinct before men existed are then only seen in their true light when they are seen in their true light when they are seen as the unconscious harbingers of man" (p. 146).

[18] Lewis, C.S. *That Hideous Strength* (Scribner, 1996)*,* p. 303-5. Interestingly it seems that in this novel it is only the character of Ransom, who, having spent time on the pre-fallen world Perelandra, has the ability to raise Mr. Bultitude to "the very borders of personality".

[19] Webb, Stephen. *On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Animals* (Oxford, 1998), p. 49-50

[20] Quoted in Andrew Linzey, "C.S. Lewis's Theology of Animals" *Anglican Theology Review* 80:1 (Winter, 1998), p. 72.

[21] Compare this quotation from Lewis's *Letters to Malcolm* (admittedly taken out of context since Lewis is writing here against novelty in worship): "I wish they would remember that the charge to Peter was 'Feed my sheep', not 'Try experiments on my rats', or even 'Teach my performing dogs new tricks'" (p. 3).

[22] *ST* II, Q. 64, Art. 1, in Linzey and Regan, p. 126.

[23] Webb, p. 9.

[24] Indeed, for Lewis (contra Sartre) hell is being alone with oneself: "Our imaginary egoist has tried to turn everything he meets into a province or appendage of the self. The taste for the *other*, that is, the very capacity for enjoying good, is quenched in him except in so far as his body still draws him into some rudimentary contact with an outer world. Death removes this last contact. He has his wish – to lie wholly in the self and to make the best of what he finds there. And what he finds there is Hell" (p. 125).